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Construction, Solipsism and Intuitionistic
Mathematics
Kevin Blum
The classical view of logic dominated the
Second International Congress of Philosophy in 1904.
Classical logicians, such as Couturat, believed
mathematics exist independent of the human mind.1
For these philosophers, mathematics was an eternal
truth awaiting discovery by human reason. Other
logicians fiercely opposed this view. At the same
Congress, Boutroux contended that philosophers should
investigate the human preference for particular forms of
mathematics within the “infinity of alternative, equally
possible [forms].” 2 Boutroux made this contention
because he believed that mathematics lacks another
kind of existence besides that conferred on them by
humans. Poincaré furthered this objection to classical
logic, evidencing the “inescapably ‘intuitive’ character
of logical reasoning.” 3 Both argued for a philosophical
investigation into the conventions underlying the
existent mathematical systems. Thus began the field of
intuitionistic mathematics; a philosophy based upon the
innately human, intuitive origins of mathematics.
Intuitionistic mathematics provides an informative
challenge to classical logic, specifically through
establishing mathematics as a human construction.
Furthermore, Intuitionistic mathematics is able to
overcome the consequence of the aforementioned
assertion and one of its principle objections; the charge
that Intuitionism leads to solipsism.
1
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Until 1907 this brief foray exploring the role of
intuition in mathematics and logic seemed forgotten. In
that year L. E. J. Brouwer published his sometimes
poetic and often obscure work, On the Foundations of
Mathematics.4 Alongside his precursors Boutroux and
Poincaré, Brouwer objected to the system of classical
logic. More importantly, he disagreed with their
position as well. He argued that the classical and early
intuitionistic logicians mistakenly supplanted the
intuition of mathematics with the language of
mathematics.5 For Brouwer, mathematics arises out of
intuition. In support of his view, Brouwer drew from
Kant’s philosophy of a priori synthetic knowledge.
According to both philosophers, time is a necessary
component of experience.6 Brouwer further argued that
there exists a close connection between time, the Self,
and the idea of mathematics. Specifically, the mind
experiences a singular moment that gives rise to
another, all the while preserving a memory of the first
moment. The experience is caused by an awareness of
the Self’s continuity over time.7 In Brouwer’s terms
this simultaneous experience is the perception of a
“twoity.” Recollecting the twoity at later moments
gives humans the notion of unity among twoities. The
mind extends these synthetic experiences over again to
form the typical conceptions of mathematics, such as
infinity and arithmetic. Thus, for Brouwer, the intuitive
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simultaneous experience of moments arising out of
each-other is the basis of all mathematics.8
Brouwer’s claim that mathematics begins in
intuition has significant epistemic consequences. First,
the assertion privileges the epistemic value of
intuitions. 9
This is clear after acknowledging
Brouwer’s use of yet another preceding philosopher;
namely, Descartes. Brouwer adopted the epistemic
method of Descartes’ Meditations, developing his
knowledge of mathematics from the point of intuition.
Such a method was required since, for Brouwer,
mathematics originates in intuition, just as certain
knowledge originates in the intuitive experience of the
thinking Self for Descartes.
Thus, for both
philosophers, certainty is derived from a claim’s
proximity to intuitions of the Self.10 Consequently, any
mathematical claim distanced from the Self introduces
the possibility of error. Such “distance” is created
through symbolizing or otherwise representing
intuitions; distinctly non-intuitive activities.
Any
formalization of intuition constitutes “an incomplete
communication of information.”11 Intuitions by their
nature are language-less experiences so any
representation of them in language admits error.
Furthermore, according to Brouwer, “intuition
proceeds independently of… ...formalization” 12 such
that “a mathematical entity is not necessarily
predeterminate, and may, in its state of free growth, at
some time acquire a property which it did not posses
8
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before.”13 This curious phenomenon occurs because
Intuitionists redefine the meaning of mathematical
assertions, in opposition to the meaning described by
classical logicians. Classical logicians believe that a
statement is either true or false. Brouwer countered this
by claiming that (i) the assertion of a mathematical
statement is that it is provable, (ii) the assertion of the
negation of a mathematical statement is that the
assumption of the statement in a proof leads to an
absurdity and (iii) some particular assertions may be
neither proven true nor absurd. 14
Brouwer’s
demonstration of the necessity for this redefinition is
illustrated below in his argument against the Law of the
Excluded Middle. Formalizations are both distanced
from intuition and have meanings that are subject to
change. This gives intuitions an epistemic privilege
above non-intuitive mathematical claims.
Such privilege becomes significant in relation to
the second epistemic consequence of Brouwer’s claim
that mathematics originates intuitively; that is, formal
mathematics becomes a human construction.
If
intuition is the only ground for certain knowledge in
mathematics, any non-intuitive claim is chosen by the
mathematician.
Such choice over non-intuitive
mathematical claims entails that truths are created,
rather than discovered.15 Thus, formal mathematical
claims are constructions because they are non-intuitive.
Moreover, since the Self is the source of knowledge,
anything epistemic assertion that exists must exist
through the Self. 16 This entails that mathematical
systems
are
merely
constructions
of
the
mathematician’s mind since epistemic entities only
obtain existence through intuitions of the Self. Because
13
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mathematical formalizations are chosen and do not
obtain epistemic existence through human minds they
are necessarily constructed.
The assertion that mathematical systems are
constructions may at first appear to be insignificant.
However, it results in important consequences for
formal mathematical systems such as classical logic. In
such systems there is a “distinctness of mathematics
from the language in which mathematics is
expressed.”17 The “distinctness” comes to pass because
mathematics is an intuition whereas the language of
mathematics is a human construction.18 According to
Brouwer, formal mathematics developed from
mathematicians’ construction of symbolic parallels to
their intuitive experience. Thus, classical logicians
create the formalizations that Brouwer cautions as
fallible. The problem is that classical logicians believe
in the “existence of immutable properties of time and
space, properties independent of experience and of
language.” 19 This belief leads them to ignore the
Intuitionist’s warning that formalizations are fallible
“[T]he classical mathematician thinks of himself as
reasoning about an objective, external domain of
entities”, whereas the Intuitionist recognizes the
constructed nature of mathematical entities. 20 The
incautious reasoning of the classical logicians leads to
demonstrably meaningless claims. Brouwer’s proof
against Law of the Excluded Middle demonstrates both
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his meaning of “meaningless” and the significant
consequence of formalizing mathematics.
For Brouwer, the LEM is a formal assertion
devoid of mathematical meaning. Such meaningless
claims have the same epistemic value as those pointed
out in the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Logico Philosophicus. The claims made by classical
logicians are not so much wrong as they are
nonsensical. This is because, by necessity, such claims
do not describe things in the world, since the only real
mathematical entities are human intuitions. The LEM
is particularly susceptible to Intuitionist critique since it
necessitates the existence of entities that are yet to be
constructed. For intuitionists, sensibility is faithfulness
to the intuitive origins of mathematics.
Nonperformable and therefore nonsensical constructions are
too far removed from intuition.
Since formal
mathematics is a human construction prone to error, it
is patently erroneous to formalize over non-constructed,
non-intuited entities. The constructions of classical
logicians such as the LEM commit such error.
Brouwer used the following argument to
demonstrate the fallibility of this Law and the fallibility
of constructing mathematical formalizations in
general.21 Write down the expansion of π with the
expansion of .333333… below it. Call the lower
expansion (that of .333333...) R. When, and if, the
expansion of π creates a sequence …0123456789… halt
the expansion of R. Call the digit where the 9 in the π
sequence of ...0123456789... occurs µ. This digit also
marks when the R expansion halts. Now, suppose R
cannot be a rational number. This means the digit µ
cannot occur.
Therefore, no sequence of
…0123456789… occurs in π. But if no such sequence
occurs in π the expansion of R continues forever.
21
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However, this would make R a rational number because
it is equal to one-third. Thus, a contradiction results
from the supposition that R is a rational number. At
this point classical logicians would assert that R must
be a rational number. Intuitionists such as Brouwer
deny this. If R is a rational number there must be two
known integers, call them p and q, such that p divided
by q is equal to R. However, this requires either
knowledge of the sequence …0123456789… in π, or
the ability to show that the sequence never occurs.
Since the sequence is not yet known to occur in the
construction of π it is impossible to assert the number
that is R.
This argument is more accessible in symbolic
terms. First, make the supposition that R is not rational.
Symbolize this as “¬p”. This resulted in a contradiction
that is then inferred to result in ¬¬p. From this
negation of a falsity, classical logicians assert a positive
truth, symbolized as “p”. Intuitionists deny this
assertion because it is based on the LEM. This law
asserts that all statements, including mathematical ones,
are either true or false (symbolized as pv¬p). This is
fine for a classical logician because they believe in the
objective mathematical truth or falsity of p.
Intuitionists, however, point out that the value of the R
expansion is as yet unknown, and therefore no assertion
can be made regarding it. Roughly, this argument
shows that for intuitionists, ¬¬p does not imply p.22
For intuitionists to accept the LEM some method must
exist to determine which of p or ¬p is true for any
proposition p. Unfortunately, no such method exists.
Such a formal presentation of intuitionistic logic
seems to contradict one of Brouwer’s main beliefs. He
argued that any attempt to bring mathematics outside
the internal intuitive experience results in fallibility and
22
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loss of meaning.
He also criticized others for
developing formal mathematical systems. This seems
hypocritical,
given
that
Brouwer
expressed
mathematical arguments for intuitionism in both writing
and speech, such as his proof against the LEM. Though
he rejected a formal construction of mathematics,
Brouwer did admit to the usefulness of formalizing
intuitively correct constructions.23 Heyting, a student
of Brouwer, later claimed that Brouwer’s objection to
formalization only applied to formalization without
consideration for the meaning of what is formalized.24
Brouwer’s own words provide evidence for Heyting’s
claim. According to Brouwer, classical logic studies
the constructions of mathematicians, rather than the
intuitions that give rise to mathematics.25 Essentially,
classical logic formalizes mathematical constructions,
whereas Intuitionists formalize intuitions only.
Classical logic is problematic because their
formalizations are in ignorance of the source of
mathematical meaning, specifically intuitions.
Nevertheless, the critique of hypocrisy is minor
compared to the problem that rests in the roots of
intuitionism itself.
This problem is a logical
consequence of the Intuitionist’s claim that
mathematics is a human construction. Explicitly, how
is any communication of mathematics a sensible and
worthwhile activity? What allows Brouwer and the
Intuitionists to decide and formalize their so-called
“intuitively correct constructions”? Mathematics arises
out of an intuitive experience and thereafter is subject
to fallibility and loss of meaning due to the limitations
23
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of language. 26 Such problems arise since formal
systems are never adequate as they are linguistically
removed from mathematical intuition.27 It seems that
intuitionism is caught in the trap of solipsism.
Furthermore, an intuitionist cannot rely on past
mathematical constructions. Unless such constructions
are remembered they must be recorded in some manner,
thereby removing them from the certainty of intuition.
It appears that Intuitionistic mathematicians must admit
to an extreme form of solipsism; a lack of certainty in
the knowledge of one’s very Self over time.
This is a serious charge against Intuitionism.
Mathematics is a valuable method and a science that
most would wish to retain. The proliferation and
development of mathematics itself are evidence
enough. Even Brouwer himself stands in agreement.
He felt mathematics was central to human experience,
finding its source in the intuitions of the Self. 28
Brouwer also believed mathematics is central to
“human epistemic life” since the synthetic experience is
applied to human experience in the world, per Kant.29
If mathematics is so vital to both empirical
investigation and human experience, why does Brouwer
make its communicability, when not meaningless, at the
very least prone to error?
Intuitionist Mathematicians can make at least
three responses to the charge of solipsism. First, since
mathematical systems are the product of human
construction mathematicians must change their
objectives. The underlying accusation in the indictment
of solipsism is that it limits the certainty of
mathematical investigation; an admittedly valuable
activity.
Intuitionists respond by reframing
26
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mathematics into an enterprise more cautious than that
of the classical logicians. The purpose of classical logic
is an attempt to penetrate the “objective, external
domain of [mathematical] entities.” 30 By sweeping
aside this platonistic account and establishing
mathematics as a human construction, the intention of
mathematics must be directed by the exclusion of
error. 31
This is because there are no formal
mathematical truths to discover. The accusation of
solipsism loses its teeth since mathematicians must
abandon their hope for non-intuitive certainty. This
response assuages the concern that Intuitionistic
mathematical beliefs are too limited by giving
mathematics a new purpose. Accordingly, the charge
of solipsism loses some of its persuasiveness.
Nevertheless, merely redefining mathematics
seems somewhat dissatisfactory as a response to the
accusation that Intuitionistic Mathematics leads to
solipsism. A second response attempts to justify
Intuitionistic formalizations. According to Brouwer,
“inner experience reveals how, by unlimited unfolding
of the basic intuition [of the Self over time], much of
‘separable’ mathematics can be rebuilt in a suitably
modified form.”32 For Brouwer, some mathematical
constructions achieve a transmission of truth from the
certainty of intuition.
However, these particular
constructions must be constructed according to a
general form. Brouwer called this form of construction
a “law-like choice sequence.” 33 That is, Brouwer
allows formal construction so long as mathematicians
utilize some constant method of determining the
epistemic value of constructions. This method enforces
30
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the equal epistemic value of the constructions; the
constructions would be true relative to each other, if not
objectively true. The constant method is the form of
construction that matches human intuition. Humans
experience a constancy of form in their intuition of the
“unfolding” Self over time. Moreover, though always
the same, intuitions are constantly recreated, and can be
separated into distinct experiences.
This allows
mathematicians to use constructions over time since
they share the form of constant, yet endlessly repeated
intuitions.34 The constancy and repetition of intuition
give mathematicians the general form to follow when
constructing mathematics. So long as constructions
share the form of intuitions, Intuitionists can accept
formalization.
Brouwer’s principle objection to classical logic,
and formalized mathematics in general, is that they
utilize unproven constructions. 35 The Law of the
Excluded Middle is an example of such use. Because
the formalizations used in the LEM are as yet not
constructed, such formalizations are completely
removed from intuition. This entails that they fail to
meet Brouwer’s requirement that constructions follow
the general form of intuitions.
Moreover, such
mathematical formalizations lack existence because
they do not begin from intuitions of the Self. Again,
this is because the Self is the measure of existence.36
Lacking a method to construct such formalizations,
mathematicians must exclude their use. However, since
other constructions proceed from intuition, Brouwer
allows their use. This both relieves Intuitionists from
the requirement of constructing mathematical
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formalizations each time they are used and undermines
the accusation that Intuitionism leads to solipsism.
The third response to the allegation that
Intuitionistic mathematics results in solipsism utilizes
the shared nature of mathematical intuitions. Brouwer
certainly believed that mathematical formalizations
were chosen; such was the source of his assertion that
mathematical systems are constructs. Nevertheless, in
drawing from the philosophy of Kant, Brouwer made
very similar claims to Kant’s argument that humans use
an a priori category of time for organizing experience.
According to Brouwer, humans use the intuition of
mathematics in their perception of existence. Unlike
Kant, Brouwer believed that the utilization of
mathematics is freely chosen by humans. The twoity
that develops out of a perception of the Self over time is
applied to the world by choice, rather than by
necessity. 37 Nevertheless, Brouwer did assert that
mathematical intuitions are the result of “certain
organizational features of the human intellect.”38 For
Brouwer, the common organizational feature is the
intuition of unity-in-plurality over time because “the
self of the creator’s self-awareness (which is ultimately
the object [and source] of her knowledge) is not... ...a
product of her legislative decision.”39 Thus, humans
cannot choose their Self; rather they can choose to
share the common intuition that arises out of an
awareness of the Self. Because humans can choose to
follow the natural organization of their intuitions, there
is a “stock of mathematical entities [that] is a real thing,
for each person, and for humanity.”40
Tieszen holds a similar view, arguing from the
standpoint of cognitive psychology. He believes it is
37
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perfectly sensible that human beings possess some
“isomorphic cognitive structure” that directs
communication.41 If Tieszen is right, it appears that
humans are free to “act in accordance with” intuitions
that arise out of a structure shared by all of humanity.42
Furthermore, this entails that humans can choose to
construct similar formalizations based upon those
shared intuitions. Thus, it is apparent from both
Brouwer and Tieszen’s conception of intuition that
Intuitionism allows for the communication of
mathematical
formalizations.
Intuitionistic
mathematics thereby avoids the charge that it results in
solipsism.
Even if the Intuitionist’s responses are deemed
inadequate, Intuitionistic Mathematics retains an
epistemic appeal.
At the very beginnings of
Intuitionistic mathematics in the International Congress
of 1904, Russell, an eminent defender of Couturat’s
position, admitted classical logic’s inadequacy as
demonstrated by the new “intuitionist” position. 43
Russell’s admission was vindicated in 1931 by Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorem. In contrast, the constructions
of Intuitionistic Mathematics have been shown to be
both sound and complete.44 Nevertheless, Brouwer had
another motivation to argue that mathematical
formalizations are human constructions. Detlefsen
argues that Brouwer’s constructivist position was “no
doubt in part due to his mistrust of all things
corporate.”45 Brouwer believed that communication is
often a hidden form of coercion. For Brouwer,
“language, formalization, [and] communication
are... ...all tools of the imperialists of the will in their
41
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attempts to conform the will of the autonomous
individual to their own.”46 Classical logicians engage
in such imperialism and deny human agents creative
freedom by purporting a platonistic account of
mathematics. These logicians are convinced of their
account because they ignore the intuitive and
consequently constructed nature of mathematics. Thus,
far from trying to channel mathematics into solipsism,
Brouwer and the Intuitionistic mathematicians are
defenders of creative freedom.
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